The FDLR militia in one of their jungle hideouts in eastern Congo
David Rutaganda recently published an insightful article titled “DRC-backed FDLR – The Genocidal Threat the World Keeps Ignoring.” The historical perspective provided in this piece is crucial for understanding the current security crisis. These insights are especially relevant as the international community continues to overlook the deep-seated ideological roots of the conflict in favor of surface-level political maneuvering.
While I agree with the core arguments of the piece, I want to contend that today’s FDLR is not the same as the FDLR of the late 1990s. Although it is still driven by the same ideology and led by some of the same genocidal figures from thirty years ago, it now represents a substantially different and more complex threat to Rwanda, the DRC, and the entire region.
This evolution is driven by two unprecedented factors:
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State Legitimization and Strategic Access in the DRC
Under President Tshisekedi, the FDLR has transitioned from being a “fugitive militia” hiding in the forests to a fully legitimized partner of the Congolese state, with the endorsement of well-connected ideological allies, including political entities such as the current Government of Burundi and notorious individuals such as Jean Luc Habyarimana, son of the former “Hutu Power” leader of Rwanda.
Through the Wazalendo/VDP (Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie) framework, the FDLR now has unprecedented access to and influence within the DRC’s military and political leadership. This legitimacy has enabled the group to institutionalize its genocidal ideology, spreading its agenda through official channels that were previously closed to them.
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The VDP/Wazalendo as a Force Multiplier
The establishment of the Wazalendo—officially recognized by the government—has provided the FDLR with a mass mobilization tool it never possessed before. By positioning itself as the operational center of gravity for this coalition, the FDLR now assumes de facto ideological and operational leadership over tens of thousands of radicalized and heavily armed youth from various ethnic communities in Eastern DRC.
Rwanda’s Defensive Measures: FDLR as an Armed Group vs. FDLR as a Threat
For the past three decades, Rwanda has had to defend itself against a real and present danger located right on its doorstep. These defensive measures have often involved collaborative efforts between the Congolese and Rwandan governments, joining their military forces to target FDLR leaders and combatants. These efforts have been notably successful, leading to a significant reduction in the FDLR’s numbers, from as many as 100,000 fighters to fewer than 5,000 today. However, while the FDLR as an armed group has dwindled; as a security threat, it is as significant as ever. The equipment and logistical support available to it today are unprecedented, and its network of supporters within and beyond the DRC has swollen dramatically.
The Long-Term Danger: The Path to State Collapse
The strategy of arming large numbers of civilian youth to support regular forces against “internal enemies” is not new; it has been used elsewhere on the continent, with devastating consequences. The current leadership of the DRC is resorting to a highly incendary strategy setting a dangerous historical precedent that could lead to the state’s own destruction and the destabilization of the entire region. By endorsing and empowering the Wazalendo/FDLR alliance, Kinshasa is following a blueprint that has led to catastrophe in other countries:
– The Sudan Precedent: In the early 2000s, the Sudanese government armed the Janjaweed militias to suppress rebels in Darfur. Over time, these militias evolved into the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—a powerful “state within a state.” By 2023, the RSF turned its weapons against the regular army (SAF), plunging Sudan into a catastrophic civil war that has lasted over 1,000 days and devastated the nation’s capital.
– The Ethiopia Precedent: During the Tigray conflict, the Ethiopian federal government heavily relied on Amhara regional forces and Fano militias to combat the TPLF. Once the immediate threat subsided, the government’s attempts to disarm these groups ignited a fierce insurgency that continues to destabilize large portions of the country. As of early 2026, the government is conducting drone strikes against the very militias that were once its most critical allies.
– The Libya Precedent: Following the 2011 revolution, the proliferation of armed groups used to overthrow the previous regime resulted in a permanent “state without a state.” Today, Libya remains fragmented into militia-controlled fiefdoms, with “revolutionary” groups wielding more power than any central government.
The Unique Danger in the DRC
What makes the DRC’s situation even more volatile is the role of the FDLR as the ideological and operational “brain” of the Wazalendo. Unlike the militias in Sudan or Libya, which were largely driven by power or local grievances, the FDLR provides a genocidal ideological core. By granting ideological and operational leadership to a group with a proven history of extremist ideology, the Congolese government is not merely creating a future rival —it is nurturing a force incentivized to maintain permanent instability for its own survival.
Conclusion
The world must recognize that the FDLR has effectively rebranded itself through the Wazalendo phenomenon. While Kinshasa may believe it is using these groups to fight M23 and confront Rwanda, history demonstrates that such “patriotic” forces pose a threat not only to Rwanda but -as recent internecine clashes in South Kivu are beginning to suggest- are slowly becoming primary agents of state fragmentation.
Just a word to the wise…
