The United States has invested rare presidential-level capital in the Great Lakes region. President Donald Trump’s direct engagement—culminating in the Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity—has elevated diplomacy at a moment when escalation could have tipped the region into a wider war. That leadership deserves recognition. The Accords offer a credible framework to end cycles of violence between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, to normalize relations, and to anchor peace in shared economic interests. Yet for mediation to succeed, perception matters as much as text.
With the recent fall of Uvira in South Kivu to the AFC/M23 movement, the U.S. diplomacy has chosen to single out one party—Rwanda—while underplaying the responsibilities of the DRC with its coalition of armed groups and its military ally, Burundi. Burundi has been as a spoiler, creating the conditions under which Uvira fell—not as an isolated battlefield event, but as the culmination of months of provocation and blockade.
Regionally, Uvira lies at the tri-junction of DRC, Burundi, and near Rwanda’s southwestern approaches, meaning instability there rapidly spills across borders through refugee flows, armed group mobility, and cross-border fire. For Rwanda in particular, developments around Uvira directly affect border security and humanitarian pressures: escalations along the Uvira axis have repeatedly driven civilians toward Rwanda for safety.
Over the course of 2025, the Burundian National Defence Force (FDNB) with over 20,000 troops in South Kivu, contributed directly to the collapse of the security situation around Uvira and its eventual capture by AFC/M23. Major FDNB–FARDC offensives appeared to have been planned to coincide with moments of diplomatic breakthrough, including on the very day the Washington Accords were signed. The assaults triggered predictable counter-offensives by AFC/M23 along the road to Uvira.
Burundian forces were “invited” by the DRC government and integrated into the Congolese army operations. But rather than acting as a stabilizing partner, the FDNB imposed a humanitarian blockade on Banyamulenge areas such as Minembwe, and conducted cross-border shelling and air-enabled operations targeting civilian zones and displacement camps, including from Burundian territory itself. These actions—openly acknowledged by Burundian military spokespeople as deliberate movement restrictions—not only resulted in civilian casualties, destruction of villages, mass displacement, but also further radicalized local ethnic dynamics.
The last thing the people of Africa’s Great Lakes region need is further escalation of violence in eastern DRC, however the reactions of U.S. officials risk weakening Washington’s leverage at the very moment when balance and trust are indispensable.
Mediators are effective when they are perceived as even-handed, and so far, this has been a repeated characterization of the U.S. mediation. In the Great Lakes, perceptions are fragile because grievances are deep and the human cost is very high, and ongoing. Public statements that appear to attribute blame asymmetrically can inadvertently harden positions. Parties that feel unfairly targeted tend to retreat from compromise, while those spared scrutiny become more emboldened and delay compliance with agreements.
This is why the Washington Accords themselves matter as an anchor. The Joint Declaration, witnessed by President Trump at the beginning of December, reaffirmed mutual commitments by Rwanda and the DRC to peaceful relations, security coordination, and regional economic integration, explicitly recognizing the Accords as a foundation for stability and prosperity. The strength of that framework lies in reciprocity: each side’s security concerns are acknowledged, and each side’s obligations are clear. U.S. diplomacy is at its best when it insists—publicly and privately—on that reciprocity.
Rwanda’s security concerns deserve particular clarity. For over three decades, armed groups linked to the perpetrators of the 1994 Genocide against the Tutsi have operated freely in eastern DRC. The neutralization of the DRC state-sponsored FDLR, as stipulated in the Peace Agreement, is not an abstract clause; it is a major obstacle to peace and central to Rwanda’s national security and explicitly embedded in the peace architecture. Any mediation that appears to discount this reality risks asking one party to accept permanent vulnerability. A balanced approach recognizes that durable peace requires verifiable action against all non-state armed groups.
At the same time, balance also demands urgency on civilian protection—especially where there is credible evidence of targeted, ethnic violence. In South Kivu’s Hauts-Plateaux, Banyamulenge communities, categorized as Tutsi, have faced repeated attacks, displacement, and rhetoric that dehumanizes them as “foreigners.” This pattern—documented by humanitarian actors and community leaders—has all the hallmarks of ethnic cleansing. Silence or equivocation in the face of such abuses is not neutrality; it is abdication. If the Washington Process is to be morally credible, it must elevate the protection of civilians to a non-negotiable priority and demand immediate measures to stop atrocities.
The Accords already provide tools to do so. They call for joint security coordination, protection of civilians, humanitarian access, and dispute resolution through agreed mechanisms rather than force. They also link peace to prosperity through the Regional Economic Integration Framework, which aims to formalize trade, cut illicit financing, and deliver shared growth—an incentive structure that only works if violence against civilians is decisively addressed.
For Washington, the policy implication is straightforward. First, maintain a disciplined public posture that emphasizes equal accountability. When violations occur, name them—regardless of the actor—and channel consequences through the Accords’ oversight mechanisms. Second, pair pressure with pathways: offer technical support for verification, joint patrols, and economic projects that create tangible benefits for border communities. Third, elevate civilian protection—especially for at-risk groups like the Banyamulenge—into every diplomatic engagement, with clear benchmarks and timelines.
The U.S. government high-level engagement has created a rare opening. Preserving this credibility now requires consistency with the spirit of the Accords. If Washington can recalibrate toward visibly even-handed mediation, it can help translate the promise of the Washington Accords into lasting peace for the Great Lakes.
