Like the publication’s slogan reads, The New Humanitarian is engaging in unnecessary misinformation
A recent article by The New Humanitarian paints a grim picture of the AFC/M23’s parallel administration in eastern DRC, focusing on taxation, mineral extraction, and the economic strain on local populations.
But while the piece purports to document how the rebels finance their operations, it deliberately misses the more urgent stories: the emergence of a functioning system of governance in eastern DRC after decades of anarchy, and Kinshasa’s crimes against humanity.
The New Humanitarian correctly notes that AFC/M23 has established a system of taxation on businesses, transport, and citizens. But it fails to place this system in its proper context: the security situation in AFC/M23-controlled territory has improved dramatically compared with the chaos that preceded it.
Predatory armed groups that once erected arbitrary roadblocks and extorted civilians have been neutralised. The taxation system has therefore had a direct bearing on governance and the rebels’ ability to impose order.
In turn, that translates into tangible public goods, chief among them security for the populations under their administration. The New Humanitarian should at least live up to its name and acknowledge the relief this has brought to ordinary people.
The New Humanitarian also fails to note that the real economic crisis facing the population of eastern DRC is not AFC/M23 taxation. It is Kinshasa’s decision to cut millions of Congolese off from their bank savings and banking services.
As the article itself acknowledges, “shortly after the M23/AFC took Goma, the government in Kinshasa ordered banks in rebel-held areas to shut. Trade was soon paralysed, wages were frozen, and many people were cut off from their savings and access to loans.”
This is not a security measure. It is economic warfare against an entire population. It amounts to collective punishment and should be condemned as a crime against humanity. Yet The New Humanitarian treats it as a footnote, seemingly determined to blame the resulting economic hardships on the rebel movement.
The article then proceeds through innuendo rather than evidence. It devotes significant space to the coltan trade, noting that the Rubaya mines generate an estimated $800,000 per month for AFC/M23 through a $7-per-kilogram tax on coltan.
In fact, the article itself acknowledges that “this represents only a small fraction of its tax revenues from trade.” So why the disproportionate focus on minerals? The answer is obvious: coltan is the hook that draws international attention. It is the narrative device that allows Western audiences to view the conflict through the lens of resource plunder rather than legitimate political grievances.
Anyone making the claim that minerals are the main prize sought by the actors on the ground should at least have something to show for it.
Furthermore, the implicit suggestion that Congolese coltan significantly benefits Rwanda is baseless. The New Humanitarian provides no figures to substantiate such a claim, and the facts contradict it. Rwanda was a leading exporter of coltan in the region long before the resurgence of M23 in 2021.
In 2014, Rwanda was already the world’s leading exporter of coltan, exporting 2,466 tonnes.
The idea that Rwanda’s coltan exports are now somehow dependent on AFC/M23-controlled mines is not supported by evidence. Rwanda’s mining sector has its own production, traceability mechanisms, and international partnerships.
The article also fails to make a crucial comparison. Burundi, Kinshasa’s ally in the conflict, also has access to Congolese minerals through its proximity to, and presence in, the war zone. Yet Burundi remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with one of the lowest GDPs per capita. If access to Congolese minerals were enough to transform a country’s economy, Burundi would be thriving. It is not.
The link between the war and economic benefits is therefore far weaker than the article implies. Clearly, the countries that stand to benefit most from mineral wars are those further up the value chain, particularly in mineral processing, rather than the countries directly involved in the conflict.
The New Humanitarian’s piece is ultimately a missed opportunity. It fails to document Kinshasa’s attempt to provoke revolt in rebel-controlled territory by cutting Congolese citizens off from their savings and banking services. The real economic crisis in eastern DRC is not rebel taxation. It is the deliberate economic strangulation of millions of Congolese by their own government.
Until The New Humanitarian and other media outlets and organisations are willing to confront and name that reality, their coverage will remain in the realm of pro-government propaganda.
