Reports that Félix Tshisekedi has tasked Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye with organizing an inter-Congolese dialogue that includes the AFC/M23 might, on the surface, appear to be a genuine step toward peace. But those familiar with the Congolese leader’s track record know better. If confirmed, this would be nothing less than a return to his playbook.
Each time after losing major battles, Tshisekedi changes the negotiation venue, stalls progress, buys time, and prepares for the next round of war. The script is tired.
Consider 2023. After excluding the M23 from the Nairobi process and subsequently losing the strategic city of Bunagana, Tshisekedi called for the deployment of the East African Community Regional Force. Regional leaders obliged. A ceasefire was agreed and enforced, and a buffer zone was established. All that remained was a political settlement between Kinshasa and the rebels.
But Tshisekedi, having enjoyed six months of relative respite, calculated that he was ready for round two. He expelled the East African force, invited SADC troops instead, and launched a fresh offensive. The result was catastrophic: a year later, he lost two major cities, Goma and Bukavu, in rapid succession.
Rather than sticking to the diplomatic track led by Angola that was underway, Tshisekedi flew to Doha and Washington, seeking new mediators and eventually accepting direct talks between his government and the M23, which had since evolved into the broader AFC/M23 coalition. Many observers allowed themselves to hope that peace was finally on the horizon. They were wrong. Tshisekedi was merely preparing for more war.
Having lost the support of SADC forces on the battlefield, he compensated by throwing money at Burundi, an impoverished and highly populated nation whose reckless leadership saw endless manpower as a disposable resource for a foreign adventure.
At one point, as many as 29,000 Burundian soldiers were deployed in eastern DRC, until they were routed and driven out of Uvira in December of last year.
Defeated once again, Tshisekedi threw the Doha process into the dustbin and ran back to Luanda, pleaded for mediation, and agreed to an all-inclusive Congolese dialogue. Yet even as he spoke of peace, he was already preparing for the next battle.
American pressure allowed him to regain Uvira and parts of South Kivu, and that small victory was enough to embolden him. He promptly ignored the Luanda track he had himself initiated, launching violent offensives on Rubaya, a mineral rich city in North Kivu, and on Minembwe, a refuge and homeland for the Banyamulenge in South Kivu. Both offensives are now unravelling.
And true to his script, Tshisekedi is reportedly tasking someone else to organize an inter-Congolese dialogue and it is none other than his ally in this war, Ndayishimiye of Burundi.
The choice of Burundi is not random. Tshisekedi knows he cannot return to Luanda, where President Lourenço appears visibly fed up with this endless circus.
Nor can he return to Doha, where a draft peace agreement he refuses to sign is already sitting on the table. So he turns to Ndayishimiye, using Burundi’s current chairmanship of the African Union as a flimsy veneer of credibility for mediation. It won’t fly.
It is not just Angola that is fed up. Tshisekedi’s adversaries on the ground are equally exhausted by his bad faith. If he continues to stall and launch murderous attacks on civilians, they will make themselves heard in the only way that moves him: by taking more territory and neutralizing his coalition.
